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1Introduction
The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, 
the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions 
have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom’s 
presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present 
the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope 
and character of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. The second part  shows the presence of the EU investors 
in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank 
of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern 
Studies’ experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies. 
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Gazprom holds a dominant position as a supplier of natural gas, first of all in Eastern & Central Europe and in the Balkans. In the case 
of other European countries, imports from Russia merely contribute to the diversification of gas supply sources, and help to introduce positive 
changes in the structure of supplies and reduce their dependence on other suppliers (for instance in Spain).
The major consumers of Russian gas in 2006 included: 
• Germany (39.4 billion m3),
• Italy (22.5 billion m3),
• Belarus (21 billion m3),
• Turkey (19.3 billion m3). 
Russia also acts as a middleman in gas exports to Europe from post-Soviet Central Asia - e.g. via Russian shares in RosUkrEnergo 
company - sole exporter of Central Asian gas to Europe, via Gazprom’s monopolistic ownership of all Russian gas pipelines and by retaining 
state control over transit. Gazprom buys nearly 60 billion m3 of gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, most of which is resold on 
the European market. Majority of these supplies go to Ukraine, although minor quantities of gas are also supplied to Hungary and Poland. 
By purchasing Central Asian gas, these countries in fact increase their dependence on gas imports from Russia. 
3Gazprom as a gas supplier
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1. Long-term contracts concluded in 2006 and 2007 guarantee Russia annual gas sales of nearly 90 bcm between 2020 and 2030. 
2. Contracts concluded between Gazprom and European companies, apart from terms of Russian gas supplies, increasingly frequently 
include provisions which grant companies affiliated to Gazprom access to individual EU member states’ final gas markets.
5country contract 
term
volume of annual 
supplies
description additional agreements
Austria 2012–2027 7 billion m3 contract signed by Gazprom with OMV, EconGas as well as with GWH 
and Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG, affiliated to Gazprom
The rules for gas reception have changed:
- change of gas recipient from OMV to EconGas ;
- GWH and Centrex, which are affiliated with Gazprom, were granted 
the right to sell gas (nearly 1.75 billion m3 annually) to Austrian end-users
Germany 
(VNG)
2014–2031 5,25 billion m3 
(possibility of incre-
asing supplies)
contract signed by WIEH (a joint venture of Gazprom 
and Wintershall) and Verbundnetzgas (VNG).
Gazprom sells gas via WIEH in the markets of other EU member states
Germany 
(E.ON)
2011–2036 4 billion m3  
(Nord Stream)
contract signed by Gazprom and E.ON on supplies via NS gas pipeline 
Germany 
(E.ON)
2020–2035 20 billion m3 contract signed by Gazprom and E.ON, being an extention 
of the currently binding contracts (to expire in 2020)
Italy 2017–2035 22 billion m3 contract signed by Gazprom and ENI which constitutes a part 
of the new strategic partnership agreement; extention of the terms 
of the currently binding contracts
- companies affiliated with Gazprom (GMT Italia, Centrex) have gained 
access since 2007 to the Italian domestic market, and sales 
of up to 3 billion m3 annually in 2010 is allowed
- ENI has been promised the right to buy assets in Russia 
France 2012–2030 12 billion m3 
+ 2,5 billion m3  
(Nord Stream)
contract signed by Gazprom and Gaz de France ; the currently 
binding contract is prolonged, and an agreement for supplies 
via the Nord Stream gas pipeline is concluded
- Gazprom’s subsidiary, GMT France, has been granted access 
to the French domestic market, and is allowed to sell up to a maximum 
of 1.5 billion m3 of gas annually from 2007
Czech Republic 
(RWE)
2014–2035 9 billion m3 contract signed by Gazprom and RWE Transgas; prolongation 
of the previous agreement on gas supplies to, and transit through, 
the Czech Republic 
Czech Republic 
(Vemex)
2008–2012 0,5 billion m3 contract concerns supplies of gas to the Gazprom-controlled 
company which supplies gas to some Czech industrial customers 
Bulgaria 2011–2030 3 billion m3 Gazprom and Bulgargaz have signed a contract prolonging 
the previously binding contract
Romania 
(WIEH)
2012–2030 4,5 billion m3 the previously binding contract has been prolonged The contract’s prolongation is made dependent on its renegotiation, 
and switching to cash payments for gas transit. The agreement provides 
for the increase of the gas transit through Bulgaria in exchange 
for co-operation in the implementation of Russian gas pipeline projects. 
Romania 
(Conef)
2010–2030 2,5 billion m3 Gazprom and Conef Energy SRL have signed a contract; 
supplies for Alro Stalina aluminium plant
Denmark 2011–2031 1 billion m3 Gazprom and DONG Energy have signed a contract for supplies from NS
Based on Gazprom in Europe: Faster expansion in 2006, Ewa Paszyc, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, February 2007; data quoted from the companies’ websites and news agencies
Major contracts concluded by Gazprom or affiliated companies with the EU consumers in 2006 and 2007
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The routes of Russian gas exports to Europe have been diversified, but to only a small extent. Almost 70% of gas exported from Russia 
to the EU member states, i.e. 81.9 billion m3 out of 121.3 billion m3 (according to CES own calculations, based on data for 2006 provided 
by the European Commission, IEA Natural Gas Information and news agencies) is sent via the gas mains which run through Ukraine. 
The two other routes used for exporting Russian gas to Europe, the Yamal-Europe and the Blue Stream pipelines, play minor roles.
Gazprom co-owns or co-manages all the gas pipelines in the Baltic states and in Moldova, 100% of the Yamal gas pipeline and 25% 
of the other gas pipelines in Belarus, and a majority of gas pipelines in Finland (as a holder of a 25% stake in Gasum Oy). It also holds 
shares in the Yamal gas pipeline in Poland (48.64%), in some gas pipelines in Germany (50% –1 share in the gas pipeline network 
of Wingas, a joint venture of Gazprom and Wintershall, and 5.26% in the network owned by VNG in eastern Germany), as well as 50% 
in the Baumgarten gas hub in Austria. In other European countries the Russian gas giant is only planning to invest in gas transportation systems. 
Additionally, Gazprom intends to make a number of new investments in gas infrastructure, the most important of which are the Nord 
Stream and South Stream gas pipeline projects. However, it has not been determined yet whether the projects will be implemented. 
Gazprom’s planned investments are intended:
• to diversify the routes for gas exports to the EU by building new pipes, omitting the current transit countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe (the Nord Stream and South Stream projects);
• to strengthen its control over gas transportation in the EU and maintain liquidity on the EU market (by investing in interconnector 
pipes, hubs and storage facilities).
• to impede the implementation of other pipeline projects aimed at supplying gas to the EU from sources alternative to the Russian ones.
For Russia, the process of promoting new gas pipeline projects is in itself an important tool for influenceing the policies of both individual 
states and the EU as a whole (cf. activities related to the South Stream project).
7Gazprom’s major investments in gas infrastructure in Europe, existing and planned 
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Gazprom has gained direct access to the final gas markets in the Baltic states, Moldova, Finland and Germany (through shareholding 
in enterprises operating on these markets) and in Ukraine (without taking over domestic assets; Gazprom’s subsidiary, GazpromZbyt, 
will handle this starting with 2008). 
Gazprom’s engagement in the final gas market in other European countries is rather small.
Gazprom is also engaged in selling gas to final consumers in indirect form, through companies which act as intermediaries in Russian 
gas trade, and have more or less transparent links with Gazprom. These companies have benefited from the liberalisation of the EU gas 
market, and now they can sign contracts for gas supplies to end-users. Their engagement in the EU has noticeably increased over the past 
three years. 
Some examples of companies which act as intermediaries in Russian gas trade in Central and Eastern Europe: 
• Vemex has been operating in the Czech Republic since 2006. The company is owned by Germany’s ZMB (33%), Austria’s Centrex Europe Energy&Gas (33%) 
and EW East–West Consult (34%), all of which are most probably affiliated – more or less directly – through ownership with Gazprom. Vemex and Gazprom 
have signed a contract envisaging annual supplies of 0.5 billion m3 of gas between 2008 and 2012, which guarantees Vemex a share of nearly 5% of the Czech 
gas market. The company also holds a licence for gas sale in Slovakia. 
• Emfesz operates mainly in Hungary. This company has no formal ownership affiliation with Gazprom; it is a part The Firtash Group of Companies, owned 
by the Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash (formerly Mabofi Holding, registered in Cyprus). The company buys gas from RosUkrEnergo pursuant to 
a 10-year contract. In 2006, Emfesz had a 20% share of the Hungarian gas sale market. The company had also signed an agreement to supply gas to Polish 
fertilizer manufacturer (the agreement has expired). In addition to the gas sector, it has invested increasingly actively in the electrical power industry (mainly in 
Hungary, but also expanding its activity to Romania and Estonia, among other countries). In 2007, negotiations on selling a 50% stake in Emfesz to Gazprom 
were initiated, without coming to a successful conclusion as yet.
• Conef is a company linked to the owner of the Romanian aluminium holding Alro, Marco Group (registered in Canada; Vitaly Machitsky, a Russian oligarch 
is believed to be its owner). It has been operating since 2002 on the Romanian market as an agent in Russian gas trade, co-operating with Gazprom. In 2007, 
it signed a 20-year contract with Gazprom for annual supplies of 2 billion m3 of gas. Another company of this kind operating in the Romanian market is 
the Cyprus-registered Imex Oil company, which is also linked to Alro. 
• Dujotekana – has been operating in Lithuania since 2001 as an intermediary in Russian gas trade. Currently, it is the third largest natural gas importer 
(preceded by the former state-owned monopoly Lietuvos Dujos and the Achema enterprise). It imports gas under a contract signed for the period 2002–2012 
and sells it in wholesale quantities, mainly to Lithuanian electric power stations. In addition to gas sales, Dujotekana produces electricity & heat and sells electric 
energy. Presumably, the company has been created with Gazprom’s support to facilitate the latter taking over shares in Lietuvos Dujos. Until recently, Dujotekana 
used to be a strategic partner of the Russian gas giant; however, its position has grown weaker lately. 
9Gazprom’s share in European final gas market
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1. Gazprom’s investments in other, non-gas sectors of the EU economy are relatively small. The company is directly engaged in Lithuania, 
where it owns a gas-fired Kaunas power plant (Kaunas CHP). Companies indirectly linked with Gazprom have invested in chemical 
industry (Germany’s Akfem and the Estonian manufacturer of chemical fertilisers Nitrofert). 
2. Gazprom has quite ambitious projects (albeit lacking specifics) for investing in the European electrical power industry. It has declared 
its readiness to participate in planned power stations in Germany, Turkey and Latvia, among other countries.
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Gazprom’s major investments in electric power engineering and chemical industries in Europe
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1. Gazprom is the exclusive supplier of gas in Lithuania and Estonia. In case of Latvia, it provides 70% of gas and controls all supplies 
to the country.
2. The state-owned monopolies responsible for gas imports & distribution and operating the entire gas infrastructure have been privatised 
in all three Baltic states. As a result of the privatisation, Gazprom has gained nearly a third of the shares in the Lithuanian, Latvian 
and Estonian enterprises, and the major shareholder in each case is E.ON Ruhrgas company, Gazprom’s strategic partner. 
3. In addition to the former monopolies, a number of private companies operate on the Baltic states’ markets (such as large industrial 
companies – Estonia’s Nitrofert being one of them, or intermediaries – such as Lithuania’s Dujotekana), importing gas directly from 
Gazprom. Many facts seem to indicate that most of these companies have informal links with Gazprom. 
4. The share of Gazprom in the Baltic states final gas markets is the largest among the EU member states.
5. Gazprom’s strong engagement affects the gas sectors and the energy security of these countries. 
• No diversification – at present, the gas pipeline system in the Baltic states is to a great extent isolated, and connected only to 
the Russian system. No feasible diversification projects or possibility of implementation of such projects exist for the time being.
• Superficial liberalisation – in Lithuania and Estonia, gas is imported by several companies, although all supplies to the three Baltic 
countries are controlled by Gazprom. It is rather unlikely that new players, independent of Gazprom, will enter the markets. 
• Modernisation – practically no investments to modernise the assets owned by Gazprom have been made so far.
• ‘European’ gas prices – the Baltic states used to pay lower prices for gas delivered from Russia until 2007 (the prices have been 
gradually rising, and last year reached approximately US$220–260/1000 m3 in comparison to US$270–300/1000 m3, which was 
the average EU price). The prices have risen to the average ‘European’ level this year in the case of the largest importers in Lithuania 
– Lietuvos Dujos and Latvia – Latvijas Gaze. According to Lithuanian National Control Commission for Prices and Energy in April 
prices for Lithuania were US$ 380/1000 m3 and are to rise in May up to US$ 400/1000 m3). The prices for Estonia’s Eesti Gaas have 
not changed since last year. Some large industrial companies (such as Lithuania’s Achema and Estonia’s Nitrofert), which buy gas 
directly from Gazprom, pay lower prices.
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Gas sector in the Baltic states – Gazprom’s strong engagement
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1. Gazprom’s engagement in Poland: 
• So far Gazprom has not invested much in the Polish gas sector, and it does not sell gas on Poland’s final market. Gazprom’s only direct 
investment in Poland is the stake it holds in the company EuroPolGaz, which owns the Polish section of the Yamal-Europe export gas 
pipeline. The Russian monopoly controls 48.64% of its shares, compared to 49.74% stake owned by the Polish company PGNiG.
• Gazprom intends to gain more control over gas transit through Polish territory, as has been proved by the company’s attempts to increase 
its share in EuroPolGaz. Gazprom also wants (either directly or through affiliated companies) to start selling gas to Polish end users. 
Emfesz company, which is indirectly linked to Gazprom and is actively engaged on the Hungarian market, has concluded a contract 
which provides for direct gas supplies to Nitric Acid plant in Puławy. However, the contract could not be implemented for formal reasons, 
and has expired recently. 
2. Major dilemmas over Gazprom’s engagement on the Polish domestic gas market:
• The opening-up of the Polish gas market is very likely to attract unreliable, not fully transparent trading companies (such as Emfesz). 
Such companies may coordinate their activities with Gazprom to the disadvantage of Poland. One example of such co-operation 
contrary to Polish interests was the coordination of activities in late 2006 between Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo, the largest suppliers 
of gas onto the Polish market. RosUkrEnergo made signing of the contract for gas supplies in 2007–2010 dependent on Warsaw’s 
consent to raise the prices of gas Gazprom supplied under the long-term contract (so-called Yamal contract).
• The possible entry of new companies on Polish final gas market may cause an excessive supply of gas to Poland, without any possibility 
of selling it abroad, since the Yamal contract (as other long-term gas supply agreements signed by Central European countries with 
Gazprom) includes a clause prohibiting the re-export of gas. 
• Direct access of Gazprom (or affiliated companies selling Russian gas) to industrial companies in Poland would mean facade 
diversification, and would reduce its chance for a real diversification of sources and directions of gas supplies. 
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Poland – firm resistance to Gazprom’s expansion
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1. Presence of foreign (including EU) investors in the Russian oil & gas sector is slight; they have no access at all to the Russian export 
infrastructure, their engagement in oil & gas upstream is relatively small, and they have minor share in the entire Russian output 
of oil & gas. 
2. At present, foreign investors usually hold minority stakes in oil and gas development projects on Russian territory. Only in rare cases 
they do own majority share blocks (Sakhalin-1 oil and gas field and Khariaga oil field).
3. The ownership structure of foreign investors (including the EU) in the Russian oil, gas and electrical power industry has been undergoing 
dynamic changes over the recent years. On one hand, the extent of their engagement in the hitherto implemented projects has been 
reduced, and on the other, ever more forin investments are being made in subsequent energy assets.
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Dynamics of foreign investments in the Russian oil & gas upstream and electric energy sectors: 2000–2008
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The state authorities have been exerting increasing pressure on foreign investors in the Russian energy sector, mainly 
in the gas upstream in the last few years. The aims of this pressure are:
• to minimise the autonomy of foreign investors, 
• to strengthen state control over the strategic deposits and over export of energy resources as a whole, and
• to increase the resource base and production capacity of the state-owned monopoly, Gazprom, at a relatively low cost
The Russian authorities have taken various actions to alter the terms of contracts with Western companies, 
as a result of which: 
• Gazprom has been taking over control of projects in which it had no shares previously (Sakhalin 2, Kovykta)
• gas produced by foreign investors is being taken over (Sakhalin 1, in the process of negotiation) 
• the results of tender procedures or contracts have been invalidated (Sakhalin 3 and the cancellation of ExxonMobil 
and Chevron’s licence for development of fields in 2004). 
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Sakhalin 1  
- estimated reserves: 485 bcm 
of gas and 307 mt of oil
- developed according 
to PSA rules
PSA  signed in 1996;
Production  launched in 2001.
ExxonMobil (operator) 30%, SODECO 
30%
ONGC 20%
Rosneft 20%
Gazprom is impeding gas exports to China. Negotiations have started 
on selling this field’s entire production to Gazprom, who wants 
to resell it on the domestic market. 
Sakhalin 2
- estimated reserves: 800 bcm 
of gas and 180 mt of oil
- developed according 
to PSA rules
The agreement  signed in 1996;
Production  launched in 1999.
An LNG plant is scheduled to start 
in 2008, which will enable gas exports 
to Japan, China and South Korea.
originally:
RoyalDutchShell 55% (operator)
Mitsui 25%
Mitsubishi 20%
at present:
RoyalDutchShell 27.5%
Mitsui 12.5%
Mitsubishi 10%
Gazprom 50% + 1 (operator)
The shareholding structure changed in 2007, when Gazprom took over 
the controlling stake (as a result of pressure exerted on the consortium 
for several years by Russian tax and ecology authorities)
Sakhalin 3 
- estimated reserves: 770 bcm 
of gas
- PSA cancelled
The licence for the field development 
was granted according to PSA rules 
in 1993. A new licence has not been 
granted. The field has not been devel-
oped yet.
Development licences granted 
to Exxon  
Mobil and ChevronTexaco 
The PSA licence was cancelled in 2004, officially due to amendments 
to Russian legislation. 
ExxonMobil wants to obtain a development licence according to general 
taxation rules. 
Japanese companies consortium is also interested in this project.
Kovykta
- estimated reserves: 
1.9 trillion m3 of gas 
Agreement on field development accord-
ing to general taxation rules as of 1997 
for TNK (currently TNK-BP).
TNK-BP 62.9% (operator)
Interros 25.8%
Irkutsk oblast 10.8%
After several years of pressure exerted by the different Russian state 
institutions , it was decided in 2007 to sell the entire stake in the field 
owned by TNK-BP to Gazprom (not yet carried out, due to disagree-
ments over the stake price, among other issues)
Khariaga
- estimated reserves: 160 mt of oil
- developed according to PSA 
rules
PSA contract  signed in 1999; 
Annual production level is 1 million 
tons of oil.
TotalFinaElf 50% (operator)
NorskHydro 40%
Nenets Oil Company 10%
Between 2004 and 2007, the consortium was accused of failing to comply 
with ecological regulations and of delays in the development of the field. 
The accusations have now stopped. TotalFinalElf has recently become 
Gazprom’s partner on the Shtokman gas field. 
The examples of pressure on foreign investors in the Russian oil & gas upstream sector  
 
20 G a Z p r O M ’ S  E X p a N S i O N  i N  T H E  E U  –  C O - O p E r a T i O N  O r  D O M i N a T i O N ?   ( a p r i l  2 0 0 8 )
OŚRODEK STUDIÓW WSCHODNICH Im. MaRKa kaRpIa
According to the Central Bank of Russia estimates, the Russian Federation received US$52.5 billion in foreign direct investments in 2007, 
which was 62% more than in 2006. A significant part of this amount was invested in oil & gas upsteram sector and in electrical power 
industry. FDI influx in the Russian energy sector has been increasing over the last three years.  
However, in 2007, a significant part (25.7%) of investments in the Russian energy sector was not allocated for new projects; instead 
they were spent on the purchase of the bankrupt Yukos company’s assets (the Italian companies Enel and Eni paid US$5.8 billion1 
for the company’s gas assets), and restructuring & privatisation of a part of the assets of the electric power company RAO UES of Russia 
(Germany’s E.ON and Italy’s Enel paid US$7.7 billion2 for two electricity generation and wholesale companies). 
Investors have also been given access to new gas upstream projects (Shtokman and Yuzhno-Russkoye fields), although under the new 
regulations adopted during Vladimir Putin’s second term. Pursuant to them, a foreign investor can have only a minority share and a right 
to a part of revenues from the sale of the resources produced in Russia (sold exclusively to Gazprom). Usually, Western companies have to 
give some of their other assets to Gazprom in exchange for access to Russian fields (vide Gazprom’s agreements with BASF and ENI).
1 http://www.eni.it/en_IT/media/press-releases/2007/04/Eni_announces__5_83_bn_acquisi_04.04.2007.shtml
2 http://www.eon.com/en/downloads/Acquisition_of_OGK4_17092007.pdf 
http://www.enel.com/en/financial/ogk5_offer/results/
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gas and/or oil fields
Shtokman
- estimated reserves: 
3.7 trillion m3 of gas
The gas field in the Barents Sea is expected to be a source 
of gas for the Nord Stream gas pipeline. 
The field is expected to come online in 2013. The esti-
mated annual production capacity will be 23.7 billion m3 
at the beginning, to finally reach a level of 67.5 billion m3. 
A gas liquifying plant is also planned.
Shtokman Development company:
Gazprom 51% (operator)
Total 25%
Statoil Hydro 24%
a new project, preliminary phase
Yuzhno-Russkoye
- estimated reserves: 
825 bcm of gas
The gas field was put into operation in late 2007. 
It is expected to be a source of gas for the Nord Stream 
gas pipeline.
Gazprom 75%, BASF 25% minus one share, 
plus one privileged share worth 10%, albeit 
without voting power.
Ongoing negotiations with Germany’s E.ON 
on exchange of assets should ultimatelly enable  
company to join the consortium (E.ON is to 
receive 25% plus one share).
a new project
Fields in the Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Area
- estimated reserves: 
900 bcm of gas
In 2007, a consortium of ENI and ENEL bought three 
gas companies, Arcticgas, Urengoil and Neftegaztechno-
logia, former assets of Yukos. The companies held licences 
for 5 fields in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area. 
Currently, gas is produced only in one field, 
due to the companies’ problems with access to pipelines.
ENI 60%
ENEL 40%
The fields were bought during the sale of Yukos’s 
assets. Gazprom has an option to buy out 51% 
of the shares, starting from 2009. 
electric power engineering
OGK-4
- wholesale electricity and heat 
producer
- the production capacity 
is 8630 MW of energy
The block of shares was bought for US$4.1 billion in 2007.
5 electric power stations located across Russia, including 
in Moscow, Krasnodar, Tyumen, Smolensk and Perm oblasts. 
E.ON 76%
RAO UES 22.5%
Minor shareholders 1.5%
The shares were bought during the privatisation 
of RAO UES at the end of 2007. E.ON has 
the right to acquire 100% of shares. 
OGK-5
- wholesale electricity producer
- the production capacity 
is 8672 MW of energy
Block of shares bought for US$1.8 billion in 2007.
4 electric power stations located in Ural, 
the North Caucasus and central Russia.  
ENEL – 60%
RAO JESS – 40%
The shares were bought during the privatisation 
of RAO UES at the end of 2007. ENEL has 
the right to acquire 70% of shares.
TGC-1 
- regional energy producer
- the production capacity 
is 6278 MW 
Block of shares bought by Fortum.
CHP plants located in the northern part 
of the Russian Federation 
(including in Leningrad and Murmansk oblasts) 
RAO UES 42.3%
Fortum 25.7%
Norilsk Nickel 5.6%
Russian Energy Project 17.7%
Other 8.7%
The shares were bought during the  privatisa-
tion of RAO UES in 2005.
TGC-2
- regional energy producer
- the production capacity 
is 2576 MW
Block of shares bought by RWE for US$0.39 billion.
CHP plants located in the northern part of the Russian Federa-
tion - comprises generating capacities of 6 regions - Arkhan-
gelsk, Vologda, Kostroma, Novgorod, Tver and Yaroslavl.
RWE (jointly with Syntez Group) 33.5%
RAO UES 49.3%
The assets were bought during the privatisation 
of RAO UES at the beginning of 2008. RWE 
has the right to increase its stake to 51% 
TGC-10
- regional energy producer
- the production capacity 
is 3000 MW
Block of shares bought for US$3 billion.
CHP plants located in Khanty-Mansiisk,Tyumen, Karagan 
and Chelyabinsk oblasts.
Fortum 76.5%
RAO UES 13.8%
Agency for Federal Property Management 2.8%
Minor shareholders 6.8%
The assets were bought during the privatisation 
of RAO UES at the beginning of 2008.
Foreign investments in Russian gas and energy sectors in 2006 – 2007
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OŚRODEK STUDIÓW WSCHODNICH Im. MaRKa kaRpIa
1. Gazprom’s presence on the EU energy market has been gradually increasing. The gas giant’s position in the EU has strengthened, 
although this process has been taking place at a relatively slow rate, especially regarding its investments in the transport infrastructure. 
The following four levels of the Russian monopoly’s presence in the EU can be distinguished:
• Gazprom as a supplier (exporter) of gas. In this area the Russian company has the strongest position in Central and Eastern 
European countries and in the Balkans, where it predominates or holds a monopoly. A number of long-term contracts that guarantee 
the continuity of Russian supplies to the EU have been signed in the last few years. Yet these contracts cannot determine whether the share 
of gas exported by Gazprom will increase in the EU overall consumption. However, the rules by which new contracts are guided 
(in some important cases European contractors have made additional concessions) clearly indicate that the EU member states are not 
only unwilling to give up long-term contracts with the Russian company, but they are even seeking to sign them. It seems quite likely 
that in the future the EU states may even end up competing among themselves for Russian gas supplies.
• Gazprom as a co-owner of transport infrastructure. The Russian company’s engagement in the EU’s gas infrastructure is still 
relatively small. It can be best noticed in the Baltic states, but also in Germany, Poland and Finland, and more recently in Austria. 
Gazprom’s investments in this area have been growing relatively slowly over recent years. What increased significantly was the number 
of infrastructural projects planned and promoted by the Russian company in the EU. It has not yet been decided whether any of them 
will be implemented at all. However, if they were implemented, the European Union’s situation in this sphere would change completely. 
In such a case, Gazprom would control most of the gas pipelines running from the CIS area to Europe. This control could be further 
strengthened by the Russian monopoly’s increasing share in the gas pipeline networks in countries bordering the EU, principally 
in Belarus. Gazprom would also have diversified export routes to the EU. Last but not least, the gas monopoly would also be able to 
impede the implementation of the projects that could diversify EU gas supply sources. 
• Gazprom as an actor on the final gas market. The Russian company’s presence on this market is still small, although it has grown steadily 
over recent years. The newly introduced principles on the EU gas market liberalisation enable Gazprom and its affiliated companies 
to become suppliers in the final gas market. The Russian company has secured the access to the final gas market while extending 
long-term contracts with individual EU member states, among other measures. Gazprom is getting involved in the European market 
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by buying shares in enterprises operating on the final gas market (as in the Baltic states), via its subsidiaries (such as ZMB in Germany, 
GMT Italia, etc.), through joint ventures (Wingas of Germany, GWH of Austria), and sometimes using companies that are indirectly 
(Vemex in the Czech Republic) or unofficially (Emfesz in Hungary) affiliated with Gazprom. 
• Gazprom as a tool of Russian foreign policy. In the last few years both the company’s management and the Kremlin have increased their 
involvement in promotion of Gazprom’s planned investments in the EU. These activities, apart from advertizing the projects as such, 
are also aimed at presenting the company and Russia itself as key actors in the EU energy sector. They are also meant to influence the 
energy policies of both the individual member states and the EU as a whole. 
2. Regardless of the implementation of the second gas liberalisation directive, none of those EU member states where Gazprom 
has been a traditionally dominant supplier has managed to diversify their supplies significantly (only the Czechs have relatively 
succeeded in doing this). Those countries which have accepted Gazprom as one of the key investors in their infrastructures and final 
markets (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) have not embarked on any diversification projects, and now have to buy gas at rates which 
are higher than the average European price. 
3. Gazprom’s strengthening position in the EU is being accompanied by a redefinition of the rules applicable to Western (including 
EU) investments in the oil & gas upstream in Russia. The share of foreign capital in projects which have been deemed strategic, 
especially in the gas sector, is being reduced, and control of such projects is transferred to state-owned companies, i.e. to Gazprom 
in the case of gas projects. Recently, investors have been given access to new oil & gas assets in Russia; however, they can only hold 
minority stakes and have no right to export their production. 
